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AN EXDNCMICS PERSPECl'IVE TEN YEARS AFTER '!HE NAB CASE 
Abstract 
'!he u.s. Justice Department brought suit against the National 
Association of Broadcasters in 1979, charging that the NAB Television 
COde restricted the SUWly of advertising. '!his paper examines 
inplications of a collusive code, concluding that the code did not 
successfully serve this p.u:pose. Television station sale prices were 
no higher in markets with a high proportion of code subscriber 
stations. stations in single station markets were no less likely to 
subscribe to the code. Finally, rates of retunl on broadcast finn ani 
ne'blork stocks did not c:llan1e when the antitrust case was settled. 
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AN E<DN<:J«CS PERSPECrIVE TEN YEARS AFTER '!HE NAB CASE 
nman:l'lOH 
rthe u.s. Justice Department filed suit against the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in 1979, chargirg that the NAB 
Television COde restricted the supply of television advertising. 
Federal District court Judge Harold Greene issued a consent decree in 
1982, umer which provisions the NAB eliminated Television COde 
sections regulatirg television ccmnercials. 
'!be intervening years allow lOOre than just a historical 
perspective on the case. CC>n;Jress presently is considerirg restrictirg 
the anomt of ccmnercial material durirg children's programs 
(flarildren's Television," 1988). 'Ibese restrictions, supported by 
organizations like Action for arildren' s Television, are exactly the 
same as those eliminated fran the NAB code (NAB, 1981, XIV, 2, c). '!be 
effect of such regulation on stations am viewers can be evaluated 
fairly only after analyzirg the effects of the NAB's television code. 
'!be National Association of Broadcasters is the priInary 
:in:lustty trade association. rthe NAB provides teC'lmical assistance, 
managerial consultirg, ani :in:lustty lal::iJyirg. Before Judge Greene's 
decision, the NAB issued voluntary radio am television "codes". 
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'!he Television Code, admi.nistered by the NAB COde Authority, 
contained both ethical provisions am advertisirg :restrictions. ~e 
ethical provisions included prohibitions on advertisirg hard liquor, 
guns, am sane other products, am provided st:armrds for a variety of 
activities incluclin] payments by advertisers for displayirg products 
within programs. 
'!he axle's advertisirg roles set maxinum. limits for minutes of 
ccmnercials, rnnnber of ccmnercials, am number of ccmnercial 
i.nten:uptions. separate limits awlied to prime-time programs, to 
children's programs, to sane other types of programs, am for network 
affiliates (NAB, 1981). ~e Code Authority nari.tored am encouraged 
subscriber ca:npliance am had the power to eJepe1 fran the cxx:le stations 
violatirg its st:armrds. 
~e stated purpose of the cxx:le was "to maintain the highest 
possible programmirg arxl advertisirg st:armrds" (NAB, COde Authority, 
1980). ~ is a reasonable goal for an in::lustry hopirg to maintain 
the goodwill of a vast viewirg am votirg audience. '!he axle might 
also have forestalled lOOre :restrictive regulations inp:>se:l by the FCC 
arxl countered labbyirg efforts by COnstIn9r groups seeking stricter FCC 
regulation of advertisirg. 
Another possible (ard unstated) purpose of the cxxle was to 
:restrict outp.It of advertisirg in the same way colluclin] finns :restrict 
outp.It in an effort to increase joint in::lustry profit. Ma:tia 
researchers like owen, Beebe, am Manning (1974, Rl. 101-111) 
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acknowledge this potential p.n:pose of the code am this possibility 
IOOtivated the Justice deparbnent suit. 
Reflect~ trade association case law, Judge Greene :roled tllat 
code restrictions on multiple product aI'lI'lCmlCemeIts ~ illegal ~ 
se.! Greene chose to enploy a :role of reason am evaluate the actual 
hann caused by the other provisions of the code. Fear~ an adverse 
decision, the NAB eventually accepted a cx:mse.nt decree am left 
unanswered the question of the effect of the code's ccmnercial limits. 
Data limitations prevent us fran directly determini.rg the 
code's impact on television advertisers. Also unavailable are data on 
art:! chan1es in the actual rnnnber of ccmnercials shown. However, even 
if these data were available am sh.owed tllat the cxxie reduced the 
output of ccmnercials, the code may not have served as a collusive 
device. '!he cxxie might sill'lply have been an important p,lblic service 
provided by a trade association concerned with its members' p,lblic 
image am the quality of its members' product. 
critical evidence of the NAB's IOOtivation for creat~ am 
enforc~ the code is whether the code increased broadcaster profit. 
'!he remai.nier of this paper evaluates illplications derived if the cxxie 
was irx:leed a successful collusive device. 
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If the pr:iInar:y pn::pose of the television code was to enforce 
collusive restrictions on the number of cxmnercials am so increase 
me.Il'iJer station am network profit, the effects of such restrictions 
shoold be observable. '!hese effects shoold be evident even when IOOSt 
programs for a given station are provided by a network. Local stations 
can show lOOre camnercials than are included with network prograIllllirg 
am can control the number of camnercials duri.Ig times when networks 
are not providi.n;J programs. several of these effects are considered 
below, each in the fom of an i.Irplication am a statistical test. 
Inplication 1: '!he sellirg price of television stations should be 
higher in markets with a larger share of audience viewirg cxxle 
subscriber stations. 
Like any other valuable asset, the price of a television 
station is the present value of a.rrrent am anticipated net revenue. 
'!he price reflects true econanic profit, rather than aCCOWltirg profit, 
am incorporates risk. 2 '!he price may be an inaccurate measure if 
markets for capital assets are inefficient am biased in one direction. 
For a collusive cxxle to increase station profit in a given 
market, a sufficient p:rqx>rtion of stations 11I.1St subscribe. '!he higher 
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the proportion of code subscribers, the higher will be profit for all 
stations in the market. 
Table 1 sunmarizes OIS regression results, the deperxient 
variable beirg the prices of ninety-six U. S. cxmnercial television 
stations sold between January 1976 am the code's suspension in March 
1982. Prices are adjusted for different nonths of sale by the 
gecmetric mean annual f.bxiy Aaa corporate bcn:l yield. 
r:Ihe variable AUDIENCE is the rnnnber of households in the A. C. 
Nielsen designated market area viewirg the station 9:00 am to midnight. 
CPI is the Bureau of labor statistics Consumer Price Irrlex. CABlE is 
the percent of households subscribirg to cable in each designated 
market area. SINGlE is a dummy variable set to one for stations in 
sirgle station markets. CDDE is the proportion of television 
households viewirg code subscriber station programs. 3 Ccx:le membership 
is recorded six nonths after the sale to acc::xJUIlt for buyer 
expectations. 
Table 1 about here 
r:Ihe significant am positive coefficient on the AUDIENCE 
variable shows the :inp:>rtance of viewer households to station's 
profitability. Likewise, the CPI variable shows that station price is 
sensitive to inflation. '!he CABlE variable is not significant. r:Ihis 
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result sinply confinns that the audience size variable is accurately 
inco:rporating the effect of cable on a station I s audience. Possessing 
a lOOllOpOly television station gives no special advantage. '!he CABlE 
am SINGIE variables are anitted fran the seccni equation without 
effect. IIrportantly, the extent of television code subscription has no 
significant inpact on station profit. 
Inplication 2: A smaller proportion of stations in single station 
markets should be code subscribers than in markets with two or IOO:re 
stations. 
If it enforces collusive behavior, the code is unnec::esscrry in 
single stations markets. stations in single station markets are 
already lOOllOpOlies am do not need the code to enforce appropriate 
IOOnqx:>ly behavior. In November 1980, seventy-two percent of stations 
in nulti-station markets were code subscribers. By contrast, only 
thirty-nine percent of stations in single station markets subscribed 
(st:.arrlard Rate am Data service, 1980). 
Although. it ~ consistent with a collusive code, the 
difference in code subscription between single am nultiple station 
markets is caused by differences in audience size. let code membership 
be a dunmy deperrlent variable. '!he inieperrlent variables are AUDIENCE 
am SINGIE (both defined above). Prabit analysis yields a coefficient 
on AUDIENCE asynptotically significant at one percent but an 
insignificant coefficient on SINGIE. '!he nodel predicts fifty-eight 
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peramt of the (DOE outcanes. stations in sirgle station markets have 
fewer viewers than stations in multi-station markets ani stations with 
fewer viewers are less likely to subscribe to the code. 4 '!he positive 
relationship between code subscription ani audience size probably shows 
how smaller stations have less reaSon to ~rt any pmlic service or 
latbyin:J characteristics of the code. 
Inplication 3: '!he rates of return on television broadcast irrlustry
 
stocks should fall when code enforcement ems.
 
Retmns on cc:moon stock in part reflect expectations about finn 
perfonnance. If the television code significantly increased station 
profits, i.np:>rtant events in the antitrust case should reduce 
broadcastin;J CCITpaIly stock retmns. Inportantly, this measure should 
detect successful code-enforced collusion atoorg the networks ani in 
regional advertisirg markets in addition to the local. markets analyzed 
in the previous inplications. 
Of <:XJUrSe, stock retmns are influenced by any nmnber of 
factors other than anticipated finn profits. 'Ib deal with these 
carplications ani test the significance of c.harges in stock retmns, 
researchers in the finance am econanics disciplines have developed a 
number of statistical techniques based on capital asset pricirg IOOdels. 
SChwert (1981) reviews ani updates these IOOdels. B:irxier (1985) also 
reviews the literature am make sane sqilisticated additions. 
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'!he basic IOOdel assumes that returns on a given stock Rjt are a 
linear ftmction of returns on the market Rmt am sane raman error: 
Rjt = Q(j + BjRmt + e:it· 
Market returns also contain a raman elenent. '!he expected value of 
errors for a given finn is assmned to be zero. For each finn, errors 
are assmned to be uncorrelated am have constant variance. 
If an inportant event like an antitrost case is expected to 
charge the returns on particular stocks, actual. returns will deviate 
fran those generated by the previous urrlerlyin3' ftmction. '!he 
statistical technique involves estimatin3' the urrlerlYinJ ftmction aver 
a base period well before the inportant event am usin3' these 
paraneters to estimate returns durin3' a test period incll.ldinJ the 
event. If the event affects finn profitability, actual returns minus 
estimated returns (abnonnal returns) durin3' the test period will differ 
significantly fran zero. 
'!he daily returns incll.ldinJ divideros on the CCll'IOOn stocks of 
nine major broadcastirg col:pOrations are eatpiled fran files maintained 
by the center for Research in securities Prices. '!he market return is 
the value TNeighted stock return incll.ldinJ dividerrls of all stocks on 
the New York stock Exchange am is taken fran the same source. Chosen 
carpanies are broadcastin3' finns or networks which own nnre than one 
television station, which are traded on the New York Stock Exd'large, 
am for which cc::uplete data are available for the relevant periods. 5 
Finns are excluded if they are a subsidiary of a non-broadcastin3' finn. 
NOC, for example is owned by the RCA COl:pOration. 
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Although the included finns often own other ccmmmi.cations 
assets like cable television syste.ms, the television broadcasting 
assets :represent a substantial enough share of eanli.n3s that the roodel. 
should detect the inpact of the antitntst case. As an aside, several 
of the finns roN own lOOre non-television assets than during the period 
of interest here. '!he cc::upani.es own television stations in the largest 
markets ani stations representirg smaller markets in all regions of the 
united states. 
'!he particular statistical test enployed here is derived in the 
~ ani follows Linn ani McConnell (1983). Drily stock returns 
am market returns for the period 3 January 1977 to 3 January 1978 are 
used to calculate nine sets of OIS parameters. '!hese parameters in 
tum are used to estimate nine sets of daily returns for the test 
period. '!he test period starts on 10 March 1982 when the NAB susperrled 
enforcement of the cxxie ani errls on 30 July 1982, two weeks after the 
proposed consent decree was filed. 
Actual returns for the test period are subtracted fran 
estimated returns to detennine abnonnal:returns. If the code enforced 
collusive restrictions, the antitntst case will generate nEgative 
abnonnal returns. Average abnonnal returns are calculated for each 
stock ani added to average abnonnal returns for the other stocks. '!he 
result is divided by the expected st:arx:Jard deviation of abnonnal 
returns. '!he resulting statistic is nonnally distributed with mean 
zero for large sanples. 
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r.Ihe cumulative abnonnal average return (CAR) for the portfolio 
of nine broadcastirg stocks is 0.457. rnte expected st:aIx:lard deviation 
S{AR) for the portfolio is 0.335. r.Ihe resultirg test statistic, Z = 
CARIS (AR) = 1.37, is not significantly different fran zero ani shows 
positive rather than negative excess:retun1s. rnte:retun1s on a 
portfolio of broadcastirg stocks TNere not significantly adversely 
affected by i.n'portant events in the antitnlst case against the 
television cxxie. 
DISCOSSION 
'!he evidence presented here cannot prove that the cxxie failed 
as a collusive device. Each of the tedmiques enployed above has 
flaws. However, the weight of evidence suggests that the code failed 
to increase station ani network profit in a manner consistent with a 
sucx::essful collusive cxxie. In addition, code membership in sirgle 
versus 11I11tiple station markets ~ to have been I1X7tivated by 
factors other than collusive restrictions on ccmnercials. 
'lhese results are not surprisirg. Even if the code's intent 
was to enforce collusive ccmnercial restrictions, code subscription was 
voll.Dltary ani violation of cxxie provisions was at worst (ani rarely) 
pmished by prahibitirg a station fran displayirg its code membership 
medallion on station advertisirg or on the air. CCImoonly, the Code 
Authority used only vetDal persuasion to discourage misbehavior. '!hat 
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the code was widely ignored is oonfinned by a 1963 FCC staff study that 
showerl forty percent of stations exceedirg code st:arrlards(Bamouw, 
1970, W. 250-51). COde enforcement am cxmpliance were problematic. 
'1b.e ability of the television code to increase station profit 
was also beiD;;J eroded by chan;1es in the broadcast in:lustry. Television 
viewers were (am are) p.n:dlasiD;;J an increasirg number of videocassette 
:recx>rders. VCRs reduce potential collusive profits to the extent 
viewers watch cx:mnercial free lOOVies or "zip" past cx:mnercials (levy, 
1983). COde restrictions on cx:mnercials at certain times of day are 
ineffective when irdividuals use VCRs to :rearrarge viewi.rg schedules. 
vrn penetration has reached fifty-three percent of television hanes 
(''VCR Usage," 1988). 
Cable television penetration was also grow~ dramatically 
duriD;;J the pericxi of the antitrust case. Despite dissentinl 
predictions by Noll, Peck, am Ma:;owan (1973, W. 151-182), the benefit 
to a major local station due to better signal reception is usually 1OO:re 
than offset by the loss of viewers to the ad:li.tional programs offered 
on cable (webster, 1983). An increase in the number of viewirg 
options, sane of which can:y no cx:mnercials, ercxles the p:>tential 
effectiveness of a collusive code by reduciD;;J the audience size for 
local broadcast stations am increasiD;;J c::c::upetition for viewers am for 
advertisiD;;J. NatioI1\tlide cable penetration increased fran nineteen 
percent to forty-six percent in the years the NAB case was be~ argued 
am is roN fifty-one percent ("By the Numbers," 1988). 
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As an additional issue, even a succ::a;sful collusive code might 
have beneficial effects on other market participants. sane code 
provisions make advertisers lNOrse off, tut sane arguably benefit 
advertisers. Code provisions which limit the number of cx:mnercials 
durirg a program help assure advertisers that subscriber stations avoid 
the sort of overoiiAlercialization that might dilute a given 
advertiser's nessage. 
Infomation about number of station cx:mnercials is valuable to 
an advertiser, tut costly for each advertiser to obtain i.rrlepe.rrlently 
for each station. '!he IOOSt inportant advertisirg in:lustry 
p,lblications, like Spot Television Rates am IBta, included code 
subscription for each station. AR;m:'ently advertisers am stations 
both gained by canmuni.catirg this infonnation. Intere8tiI'gly, 
advertisers did not brirg suit against the television code (or the 
radio code), durirg the entire period before the Justice Department 
brought its case. 
Not only advertisers might i.rrlirectly benefit fran an effective 
code. An effective code reduces the number of cx:mnercials. Although 
television cx:mnercials may contain valuable infonnation, an:i sate 
number, of program i.nterruptions certainly are desired by consumers, the 
typical consumer prefers fewer cx:mnercials on television. As mentioned 
above, advertisers lNOrry that VCR viewers will delete cx:mnercials fran 
recoroed programs, suggestirg that viewers firxi them urrlesirable. 
Research by Barnett (1966) am smveys by steiner (1963) also suworts 
this consumer attitude. Television viewer lobbyirg groups like Action 
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for Children's Television recognized the potential disadvantages of the 
consent decree ani even filed briefs OR'OS~ it. 
Althcugh a less inp:>rtant consideration, an effective collusive 
code lNalld also inprove television program quality. '!he code only 
restricted the mnnber of c:xmne:rcials. other d.i.nensions of prograns 
were not controlled by the NAB ani are in arr:l case nearly inpossible to 
measure meanirgfully. In particular, stations have incentive to 
attract lOOre viewers by increasirg all of the dimensions of program 
quality, d.i.nensions like signal S'tren3th, signal clarity, ani hours of 
operation (Fournier, 1985; Besen 1976; ()wen, et al., 1974, W. 101­
111) . stations ani networks can even alter the nature of prcgrantlli.rg 
itself to attract lOOre viewers. 
'!he effects of such a decision are obvious. cost increases 
eventually outweigh increases in audience size ani potential lOOnopoly 
profit is dissipated in whole or in part. '!he difficulty faced by all 
cartels in lOOnitorirg arxl controll~ outpIt is exaeemated in the 
television in:iustry by the nultidimensional nature of television 
prcgrantlli.rg• 
Econanic theozy generally favors <:X::q)etitive markets but also 
recognizes that eatpetitive markets may fail, especially in the case of 
products characterized by joint COI1Sllllp1:ion. Television signals have 
this characteristic, ani enc:x:JUragirg their optimal production may i.n'ply 
allowirg sane lOOl'lCp)ly power. J~ Greene's consent decree seems to 
have made the not \.ll'lCXIDIlY)n error of considerirg damage to sane in:iustry 
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'!he equations derivirq the z statistic test~ the significance 
of amulative average excess retums to broadcastirq stocks follow Linn 
am!t:Connel.l (1983) in tum aR>ly~ techniques in Fama (1976), Brown 
am warner (1980), am DeGroot (1975). '!he statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that the amulative average excess retums are significantly 
different fran zero. '!he statistic has an asynptotically nonnal 
distribution with mean zero am st:amani deviation one. 
'!he Z statistic is calculated as the followinJ: 
z = CAR / S (AR) , 
N 





5tCAR:j) = { ~ [1 + l/T + CRmt-Rm)2 / ~CRm!t-Rm) 2 ] }~, 
1 
S(AR) = [ T-2 / N(T-4) ]'5, 
where 
N = l1\llli:)er of finDs, in this case nine, 
Q = l1\llli:)er of trading days in the test pericxl, in this case 100, 
j = a finn, 
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Rjt = d:Jserved daily :retum en finn j 's stock, 
Rmt = dJserved daily :retum en the market, 
A = estimated parameter, 
~ = variance of residuals fran OIB :regxessien for the base pericx:l 
for finn j, 
Rut = average daily :retum on the market duriDJ the base pericx:l, an:i 
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its code in their IOOdels. 
3. sources for the data include Broadcastim-cablecastim 
yeartxx>k, various years; COde News, various issues; A. C. Nielsen, am 
Co., Market IBypart SUnlnaries, various issues; am Spot Televisiat 
Rates am IBta, various i.sS1:aes. unless otherwise stated, data are 
recorded at time of sale. 19>rcpriate variables are adjusted to 
Nove.ni:er 1979. 
4. If code subscriptiat in:::reases profit J:ut statioos with 
larger au:li~ are m:>:re likely to subscribe, a problem arises. 'Dle 
code causes am is a result of higher profit. Foster am Hull (1986) 
address this problem by enployin) a dlmmy erdogerD.JS variable IOOdel. 
'!he IOOdel yields results consistent with those :reported here. 
22 
NAB case 
5. '!he firms are the American Broadcastirg CQIpanies, CBS 
Inc., capital Cities carm.micatioos, COX cemu.micatial, Gannett, 
Liberty corp., Metranedia, storer, am Taft Broadcastirg. 
